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1TENNESSEE BUREAU OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION 
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD 
Samuel Panzarella ) Docket No.  2015-01-0383 
 ) 
v. )    State File No. 79681-2015 
 ) 
Amazon.com, Inc., et al. )
 ) 
 ) 
Appeal from the Court of Workers’ ) 
Compensation Claims )
Audrey A. Headrick, Judge )
Vacated and Remanded - Filed January 18, 2017 
In this appeal, the employer challenges the trial court’s decision to treat the proceeding 
before it as an expedited hearing rather than a trial on the merits.  It also disputes the trial 
court’s determination that the employee would likely prevail at a hearing on the merits in 
establishing that his injury arose primarily from a hazard incident to his employment, and 
it disputes the court’s award of medical and temporary disability benefits.  The employer 
denied the claim, contending the employee’s injury was idiopathic.  Following a trial on 
the merits, the court determined that, because the employee was not at maximum medical 
improvement, the trial would be treated as an expedited hearing pursuant to Tennessee 
Code Annotated section 50-6-239(d).  The court found the employee was likely to prevail 
at a hearing on the merits and awarded medical and temporary disability benefits.  The 
employer has appealed.  We vacate the trial court’s decision and remand the case for the 
trial court’s determination of the benefits, if any, to which the employee is entitled based 
upon the proof presented at the trial on the merits. 
Judge David F. Hensley delivered the opinion of the Appeals Board in which Presiding 
Judge Marshall L. Davidson, III, and Judge Timothy W. Conner joined. 
W. Troy Hart, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the employer-appellant, Amazon.com, Inc. 
Robert A. Wharton, Jr., Chattanooga, Tennessee, for the employee-appellee, Samuel 
Panzarella
2Factual and Procedural Background 
 Samuel Panzarella (“Employee”) alleged that he suffered an injury to his left knee 
arising primarily out of and occurring in the course of his employment with 
Amazon.com, Inc. (“Employer”).  He alleged that while he was working third shift on the 
night of August 20-21, 2015, he bent down to pick up a piece of paper from the floor and 
twisted his knee, causing him to fall to his knees with his left knee hitting the floor before 
his right knee.  He reported the injury immediately and sought first aid at AmCare, 
Employer’s on-site clinic.  In a Non-Occupational Complaint Report Employee 
completed at AmCare, he stated the reason for his visit was “muscle spasms in calf that 
radiate to behind the knee, caused loss of balance two times.” 
 The following morning, Employee sought treatment from his primary care 
provider, a physician’s assistant at Fast Access Healthcare.  He complained of left leg and 
knee pain that began at work.  He reported that he had chronic pain in his right ankle and 
that “compensating on [his left] leg [] caused a fall onto [his left] knee.”  After four visits 
with the physician’s assistant, an MRI was obtained that indicated a possible meniscal 
injury, and on September 22, 2015, the physician’s assistant referred Employee for an 
orthopedic evaluation.  Although the record is unclear as to Employee’s selection of a 
panel physician, it appears that Employee chose Dr. Barry Vaughn from a panel given to 
him verbally while on a conference call with his attorney and Employer’s insurance 
carrier.
 Employee saw Dr. Vaughn on November 24, 2015.  The report of the visit 
includes the following: 
Patient reports leaning forward to pick up a piece of paper at work.  When 
he twisted his left knee, he felt a tearing sensation in the posteromedial 
aspect.  His knee then gave way and he fell onto the knee applying a valgus 
stress to the knee.  He has had left knee pain with swelling, popping and 
giving way since the injury.  He was seen by his primary care physician . . . 
[and] also had MRI.  Exam is auspicious for medial meniscus tear as well 
as MCL sprain.
Dr. Vaughn recommended surgery, but Employer authorized no additional medical care.  
On January 22, 2016, Employer denied the claim, asserting that Employee’s injury was 
idiopathic.
Employee filed a petition for benefit determination on November 6, 2015.  At an 
initial hearing on February 1, 2016, the parties advised the court that Employee was 
seeking medical and temporary disability benefits and that the case was, therefore, not 
3ready for setting deadlines typically included in initial hearing orders.1  Nonetheless, in 
an order entered on February 4, 2016, the parties agreed to specific scheduling dates, 
including a February 5, 2016 date for Employee to “file a Request for Expedited Hearing 
form contemporaneously with a signed affidavit.”  The order stated that “[c]ontingent 
upon [Employee] timely filing a Request for Expedited Hearing, the parties agreed to 
schedule an Expedited Hearing in this matter.”  It set the expedited hearing for April 27, 
2016, and included specific discovery deadlines in anticipation of that hearing. 
 On April 5, 2016, Employer requested a status conference, as Employee had not 
filed a request for an expedited hearing and had not responded to discovery within the 
timeframes as previously ordered.  On April 6, 2016, the court issued an order scheduling 
an initial hearing on April 27, 2016, the date that the expedited hearing had previously 
been set, noting that Employee’s counsel did not “want an expedited hearing” and that 
Employee “violated the Agreed Order entered . . . on February  4, 2016” by failing to file 
a request for expedited hearing.  The court’s April 6, 2016 order additionally noted 
Employee’s “readiness to proceed with a ‘real trial.’”  On May 2, 2016, an initial hearing 
order was issued scheduling the case for a trial on the merits on July 28, 2016.  The order 
additionally established dates by which the parties were to complete discovery and 
various procedural matters.   
On July 5, 2016, the trial court amended the initial hearing order, observing that 
Employee’s attorney had requested the July 28, 2016 trial be postponed due to family 
circumstances.  The order rescheduled the trial for September 20, 2016, and noted the 
parties’ agreement to depose Dr. Vaughn on July 13, 2016 and to participate in mediation 
by August 19, 2016.  In addition, the order provided that pre-hearing statements would be 
filed on or before September 6, 2016.  On September 19, 2016, the trial court issued an 
order cancelling the September 20, 2016 trial due to Employee’s failure to file the 
documents required by the court’s previous orders that were necessary to proceed with a 
trial.  Ultimately, a trial was held on October 28, 2016.  On November 23, 2016, the trial 
court issued an expedited hearing order finding that “the disputed issue of permanent 
partial disability is not ripe for decision and, therefore, [the court] cannot enter a final 
order resolving all disputed issues.”  The court determined that “[b]ecause the evidence 
submitted at the hearing did not address the permanency of [Employee’s] injury, the 
Court cannot consider the October 28 hearing to be a Compensation Hearing.”  The court 
1 At the time of the February 1, 2016 initial hearing, the Bureau’s regulations addressing Mediation and 
Hearing Procedures defined initial hearing as follows:  “With the exception of a hearing of temporary 
disability or medical benefit issues conducted on an expedited basis, an initial hearing shall be the first 
hearing before a workers’ compensation judge where the judge will consider issues related to the efficient 
processing of the case.”  Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 0800-02-21-.02(15) (2015).  November 2016 revisions 
to the regulations no longer defined “initial hearing,” but instead defined “scheduling hearing” as follows:  
“With the exception of an expedited hearing, a scheduling hearing shall be the first hearing before a 
workers’ compensation judge where the judge will consider issues related to the efficient processing of 
the case.”  Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 0800-02-21-.02(20) (2016).   
4also determined that Employee was likely to prevail at a hearing on the merits in 
establishing he suffered a compensable injury and awarded temporary disability and 
medical benefits.   
Employer has appealed, arguing the trial court erred in treating the October 28 trial 
as an expedited hearing and in awarding benefits.  For the reasons that follow, we vacate 
the trial court’s November 23, 2016 expedited hearing order and remand the case for the 
trial court’s determination of the benefits due Employee, if any, based on the proof 
presented at the October 28 trial on the merits.  Our resolution of this issue pretermits all 
other issues raised in the appeal.
Standard of Review 
The standard we apply in reviewing a trial court’s decision is statutorily mandated 
and limited in scope.  Specifically, “[t]here shall be a presumption that the findings and 
conclusions of the workers’ compensation judge are correct, unless the preponderance of 
the evidence is otherwise.”  Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-239(c)(7) (2015).  The trial court’s 
decision may be reversed or modified if the rights of a party “have been prejudiced 
because findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions of a workers’ compensation judge: 
(A) Violate constitutional or statutory provisions; 
(B) Exceed the statutory authority of the workers’ compensation judge; 
(C) Do not comply with lawful procedure; 
(D) Are arbitrary, capricious, characterized by abuse of discretion, or 
clearly an unwarranted exercise of discretion; or 
(E) Are not supported by evidence that is both substantial and material 
in the light of the entire record.”
Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-217(a)(3) (2015). 
Analysis 
 Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-239 provides the mechanism by which 
workers’ compensation judges conduct hearings and issue orders awarding or denying 
benefits.  Section 50-6-239(c)(6) specifies that “the employee shall bear the burden of 
proving each and every element of the claim by a preponderance of the evidence.”  By 
contrast, at expedited hearings addressing “disputes over issues provided in the dispute 
certification notice concerning the provision of temporary disability or medical benefits,” 
a judge may award such benefits “upon determining that the injured employee would 
likely prevail at a hearing on the merits.”  Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-239(d)(1) (2015). 
 We first addressed these differing burdens of proof in McCord v. Advantage 
Human Resourcing, where we stated, 
5Thus, subsection 239(d)(1) establishes a different standard of proof for the 
issuance of interlocutory orders at expedited hearings than the standard of 
proof required at compensation hearings.  Contrary to Employer’s position, 
an employee need not prove every element of his or her claim by a 
preponderance of the evidence in order to obtain relief at an expedited 
hearing.  Instead, as reflected in the plain language of subsection 239(d)(1), 
the judge may issue an interlocutory order upon determining that the 
employee would likely prevail at a hearing on the merits.
McCord v. Advantage Human Resourcing, No. 2014-06-0063, 2015 TN Work. Comp. 
App. Bd. LEXIS 6, at *7-8 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. Mar. 27, 2015).  We held in 
McCord that “an employee need not prove each and every element of his or her claim by 
a preponderance of the evidence at an expedited hearing to be entitled to temporary 
disability or medical benefits, but must instead present evidence sufficient for the trial 
court to conclude that the employee would likely prevail at a hearing on the merits.”  Id.
at *9.  We subsequently described the burden of proof on an employee in an expedited 
hearing as a “lesser evidentiary standard.”  Buchanan v. Carlex Glass Co., No. 2015-01-
0012, 2015 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 39, at *6 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. 
Sept. 29, 2015). 
 Here, following a full evidentiary hearing on the merits, the trial court concluded 
that “[b]ecause the evidence submitted at the hearing did not address the permanency of 
[Employee’s] injury, the Court cannot consider the October 28 hearing to be a 
Compensation Hearing.”2  However, at the outset of the trial the judge read aloud the 
parties’ stipulations, including the stipulation that “[t]he employee has not reached the 
maximum level of medical improvement.”  The trial judge asked the parties, “[d]oes that 
sound accurate to everyone,” and both parties responded affirmatively.  By determining 
after the trial had concluded that it would “treat the hearing as an expedited, or 
interlocutory, hearing pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-239,” the 
court effectively lessened Employee’s burden of proof.  Thus, Employee was able to 
avoid the mandate of section 50-6-239(c)(6) that “at a hearing the employee shall bear the 
burden of proving each and every element of the claim by a preponderance of the 
evidence.”  It is clear from the record that the parties requested a trial on the merits and 
participated in the October 28, 2016 hearing believing it to be a trial on the merits at 
which Employee would be required to prove the essential elements of his claim by a 
preponderance of the evidence.  When the case was tried, the parties were unaware that 
Employee would not be required to prove his case by a preponderance of the evidence.  
Employer asserts that its strategy at trial differed from the strategy it would have 
2 “Compensation Order” is defined as “an order by a workers’ compensation judge following conclusion 
of a full evidentiary hearing or a decision on the record . . . .”  Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 0800-02-21-
.02(7) (2016). 
6employed at an expedited hearing.  Employer’s legitimate belief that it was participating 
in a trial on the merits could reasonably have been a factor in its decision not to present 
witnesses or affidavits that it might have presented at an expedited hearing.   
We agree with Employer that the trial court did not have the discretion following a 
trial on the merits to treat the proceeding as an expedited hearing, and that Employer was 
prejudiced by the trial court’s decision to do so after the fact.  Due to its post-trial 
decision to treat the proceeding as an expedited hearing and not a trial on the merits, the 
trial court did not address whether Employee met his burden of proving by a 
preponderance of the evidence “each and every element of the claim.”  It is not for us, in 
the first instance, to determine the benefits due Employee, if any, based upon the 
evidence presented at the trial.  See Fritts v. Anderson Cty. Election Comm’n., No. 
E2003-00015-COA-R3-CV & No. E2002-03118-COA-R3-CV, 2003 Tenn. App. LEXIS 
564, at *8 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 11, 2003) (“It is inappropriate for this Court to assume 
the role of original fact finder, even if the factual record appeared complete.”).  
Accordingly, we must vacate the trial court’s order and remand the matter for the trial 
court to determine the benefits due Employee, if any, based upon the evidence presented 
at the October 28, 2016 trial.3
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the trial court’s order and remand the case 
for the determination of the benefits due Employee, if any, based upon the evidence 
presented at the October 28, 2016 trial. 
3 On January 10, 2017, Employer filed a motion requesting that the record on appeal be supplemented 
with several pages of the trial transcript that were inadvertently omitted.  The motion is granted, and the 
record has been supplemented with the missing pages. 
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